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Putting Unity in Its Place:
Organic Unity in Plato’s 
Phaedrus
Franco V. Trivigno
The notion of organic unity has had a long history in aesthetics and 
art criticism.1  It is a normative aesthetic ideal, which historically has 
been applied to several of the ﬁne arts, most prominently painting and 
literature.  Both organic unity itself and its critical uses have their origin 
in Plato’s Phaedrus.  In the dialogue, Socrates introduces this notion in 
order to criticize Lysias’ speech, which Phaedrus greatly admires.  The 
main goal of this paper is to get clearer on what Plato means by organic 
unity as a normative principle for writing.  I ﬁrst formulate what I will 
call the principle of organic unity [OU], and then subject it to a rigorous 
critique.2  I argue that the principle is incompatible with earlier claims 
in the dialogue, that it warrants unfair criticisms of Lysias’ speech and 
that it fails to account for far more serious charges against Lysias.  I claim 
that the principle as stated by Socrates is deﬁcient as a critical tool and 
intentionally incomplete, primarily because it does not accommodate 
the main intention or purpose of a speech.  The principle as implied in 
the Phaedrus is, I argue, teleological, incorporating a uniﬁed function or 
purpose with respect to the souls of its audience.  I attempt to reconstitute 
the organic ideal and to restore its proper context in the larger discussion 
of writing by amending the principle in several stages.  In the end, I test 
the reconstructed principle by using it to assess Plato’s own intentions in 
writing the Phaedrus and the unity of the Phaedrus itself.3
I
At the end of Lysias’ speech, Phaedrus’ enthusiasm for it is evident. 
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Visibly “lit up by the speech,” he calls it “extraordinary, both in language 
and other respects” (234c-d).4  Phaedrus declares that no other could 
“make a greater or better speech on the same theme (tou autou pragmatos)” 
(234e), on the grounds that Lysias “didn’t leave out any of the items that 
are naturally implied by the topic” and “everything was given a worthy 
treatment” (235b).  Later in the dialogue (263d-266d), Socrates introduces 
the ideal of organic unity speciﬁcally to clarify his criticisms of Lysias’ 
speech.  He says:
Every speech like a living creature should be put together with its own 
body so that it is not without a head or without a foot but has a middle and 
extremities, written in such a way that its parts ﬁt together and form a 
whole. (264c)
The account, as stated, seems primarily to refer to the internal 
organization of the different parts of a speech.5  Socrates refers to the 
“compelling logic of composition,” or alternatively, “logographic 
necessity” (tina ananchên logographikên), with which a speech ought to be 
composed (264b7).
There are “two forms or aspects (duoin eidoin),” which contribute to 
the organic unity of a speech.  First, one should begin, as Socrates did 
in his ﬁrst speech, with a deﬁnition of the main topic under discussion 
(265d).  Beginning with a deﬁnition allows for “the speech to progress 
with clarity and internal consistency” (265d). Second, one should proceed 
to an analysis, which divides a topic at its natural joints:
To have the power, conversely, to cut up a composition, form by form 
according to its natural joints and not to try to hack through any part as 
a bad butcher might .... [J]ust as the body, which is one thing, is naturally 
divided into pairs of things with both parts having the same name (called, 
for example, left arm and right arm), so also [Socrates’] two speeches 
assumed that madness is by its nature one form in us, though capable of 
being divided into two parts. (265e-266a)
Taken together, these two activities constitute the dialectical method of 
“collection and division,” of which Socrates claims to be “a lover” (266b). 
They confer nothing less than “the ability to speak and think” (266b).   
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This account sets the bar for an organically uniﬁed speech extremely 
high.  Notice that the ability to fashion a proper deﬁnition depends on 
prior knowledge of the form or essence of the deﬁniens.  Socrates refers 
to the ability to fashion a deﬁnition as requiring “someone whose sight 
can bring into a single form (mian idean) things which previously have 
been scattered in all directions” (265d). Knowledge of the form is, on this 
account, a necessary condition of an organically uniﬁed speech. Thus, the 
existence of an organically uniﬁed speech is predicated on the existence 
of a dialectician, one skilled in the method of collection and division, who 
is a perfect knower with respect to the topic at hand.6   
At this point, it might be useful to formulate the principle of organic 
unity [OU] in order to assess it: 
[OU] A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling 
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition, proceeds to 
analyze the topic according to its nature, and is written by someone with 
dialectical knowledge of the topic.
I want to articulate ﬁve related criticisms of this ideal from prior sections 
of the Phaedrus itself in order to motivate my distinction between the 
organic ideal as stated and as implied.  I am not here criticizing the ideal as 
stated from a perspective outside the text, but rather attempting to show 
that the ideal’s inadequacy can be articulated from within the dialogue’s 
own perspective.  This provides at least partial warrant for my claim that 
it is meant to be reformulated.  
First, Phaedrus is right to object that “the rhetorical part has escaped” 
(266c).  While rhetoric had been earlier deﬁned as “a certain guiding of 
the souls (psychagôgia tis)” (261a7-8), the ideal as stated is indifferent to 
audience.  Second, to the extent that audience is implicitly acknowledged, 
the account of dialectical knowledge makes it instrumental to the goal 
of audience deception.  Knowledge confers the ability to lead another 
“incrementally, step by small step, through similarities away from the 
truth to its opposite” (262b).  Third, Socrates’ ideal omits any mention 
of style.  The organic ideal as stated would seem to favor a technically 
precise discourse, one conducive to the expression of a clear deﬁnition 
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and unequivocal analyses. However, both of Socrates’ own speeches were 
stylistically distinct, the ﬁrst being similar to Lysias’ in its use of certain 
rhetorical tropes, and the second speech is highly poetic and rich in vividly 
erotic imagery.  Fourth, Socrates’ account fails its own rational test by 
not making the relevant distinctions, or cuts, regarding its own topic: 
speeches.  Socrates does not clearly distinguishing between written and 
spoken speeches.  His principle of organic unity is expressly a criterion 
for written speeches, but he applies it equally to his own speeches, both of 
which were extemporaneous.  Fifth, the ideal contains no reference to erôs, 
or the kind of relationship that must obtain between two people in order 
for the erôs for the forms to be inspired and nourished.  This is peculiar, 
since erôs was the foundation of Socrates’ mythic account in the Palinode. 
Socrates calls himself a lover of collections and divisions (266b3), but love 
of a method seems very far from the throbbing, aching, soul-consuming 
love for one’s beloved and the reverential awe and terror caused by the 
memory of the form provoked through him, as vividly described in the 
Palinode (251aff.). 
In the next section, I will pursue yet another criticism of the organic 
ideal: it does not adequately characterize what is wrong with Lysias’ 
speech, though this is why Socrates introduced it in the ﬁrst place.
II
The ideal of organic unity is not articulated as an independent aesthetic 
principle, but rather for use as a critical tool in order to assess Lysias’ 
speech.  It is the beginning of the speech that Socrates scrutinizes:
You understand my affairs, and you’ve already heard how I think they help 
us both, when things work out.  Nor do I expect to fail to get what I ask for 
just because I don’t happen to be in love with you.
When lovers lose their passion, they come to regret whatever beneﬁts they 
may have conferred.  (230e-231a)
Socrates interrupts Phaedrus before he ﬁnishes the last sentence the ﬁrst 
time they critique it (262e), but allows him to ﬁnish when they repeat it to 
set up the second criticism (263e-264a).  This is done to emphasize that the 
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ﬁrst criticism is focused solely on the ﬁrst paragraph, whereas the second 
concerns the relation between the ﬁrst two paragraphs of the speech. 
Socrates asserts two main criticisms: ﬁrst, Lysias does not clearly deﬁne 
love at the beginning of his speech; second, he proceeds in a way that is 
not logical or systematic but that seems spontaneous.  Both criticisms aim 
to show that Lysias is not someone who knows the truth about his subject, 
thus making his speech both laughable and artless (262c).  However, the 
ideal fails as a critical tool on two basic counts: the criticisms are unfair, 
and they omit more serious problems.  
Socrates’ ﬁrst criticism begins from the claim that, regarding some 
topics, like iron and silver, we generally agree about what we mean by 
them, while regarding others, like goodness and justice, we generally 
disagree (263a).  The good orator will know which topics belong to the 
‘shared class,’ and which to the ‘disputed class’ (263b).  Erôs clearly belongs 
to the disputed class, and this ambiguity is just what makes it ripe for 
rhetorical manipulation.  For the disputed class, it is necessary to compel 
one’s audience to see the topic as a determinate thing by deﬁning it at 
the beginning.  Unlike Socrates’ emphatic deﬁnition at the beginning of 
his own speech, Lysias did not begin with a deﬁnition and thus did not 
“compel (ênankasen) us to see erôs as one deﬁnite thing (the way he wanted 
us to see him)” (263d). 
Socrates’ second criticism follows immediately upon the ﬁrst.  The 
speech does not follow any logical order—there is no “compelling logic 
of composition”—but rather “the elements of the speech were poured 
out in a heap” (264b).  Lysias begins “at the end, swimming through the 
speech upstream on his back, beginning with what a lover would say to 
his darling after his love is gone” (264a).7  Lysias’ speech begins at the end 
in two senses: ﬁrst, by beginning in the ﬁrst paragraph with what looks 
like a summarization of a speech already given; and second, by making 
the second paragraph begin with the end of the love affair, rather than 
the beginning.  Indeed, Socrates concludes, like the epigram on the tomb 
of Midas, “it hardly matters in what order” one reads the parts of Lysias’ 
speech (264d-e). 
Taken together, Socrates’ two criticisms amount to the claim that Lysias’ 
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speech lacks organic unity, as it lacks a clear deﬁnition and logical analysis 
of its topic.  Since it lacks these, Socrates concludes that the speech is 
artless and that Lysias does not know the truth about love and thus does 
not possess the art of rhetoric.  Many commentators have taken Socrates’ 
critique as devastating.8  A clear assessment of these criticisms, however, 
will reveal various difﬁculties for Socrates’ account.  As I hope to show, 
Phaedrus was not entirely wrong to be excited about—indeed, to be lit up 
by—Lysias’ speech.9  
Socrates seems to infer, from the lack of a clear deﬁnition of ‘love,’ a 
failure on the part of Lysias to recognize ‘love’ as a member of the disputed 
class of topics.  Had Lysias properly recognized love as disputable, he 
would have begun with a deﬁnition.  But this seems wrong on several 
counts.  First, Lysias clearly recognizes that love is ambiguous.  The 
disputable nature of love forms the very core of his argument in favor of 
taking a non-lover.10  Lysias does not deny that there are some beneﬁts from 
love, but for every beneﬁt, one can expect at least equal harm.  By taking a 
non-lover, one gets all the beneﬁts of love, without all of its problems and 
hassles.  Second, a clear deﬁnition would actually make his speech easier 
to refute.  The lack of a clear deﬁnition, according to Socrates, prevents 
Lysias from getting us to see Erôs “the way [Lysias] wanted us to see [Erôs]” 
(263e).  But one knows exactly where to attack a speech that begins with a 
deﬁnition.  The weight of the core claim of Lysias’ speech, by contrast, is 
diffused amongst the many examples.  Lysias does get his audience to see 
love in the way that he wants precisely because he does not deﬁne it in 
the beginning.11  Third, the criticism assumes that explication rather than 
persuasion is the goal of the speech.  This is wrong in two ways: ﬁrst, the 
ﬁctional non-lover wants the boy to whom he is speaking to take him as 
a lover; and second, Lysias is trying to show, through his artful defense 
of an implausible claim, that one should employ him as a speech-writer. 
Neither of these goals is necessarily tied to an explication of the nature of 
love. Finally, Socrates’ criticism takes the ﬁctional non-lover as equivalent 
to, or at least standing in for, Lysias.  Socrates, by contrast, several times 
resists being identiﬁed with his non-lover (235c-d, 237a-b, 238d, 242d, 
244a, 257b, 263d).  Even if it did follow that the absence of a deﬁnition 
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were evidence for a speaker’s failure to recognize the disputed nature of 
his topic, it surely does not follow from the fact that the ﬁctional non-lover 
does not deﬁne love that Lysias did not recognize it as disputable.  Nor 
does it follows that Lysias does not know what love is. 
Socrates’ second criticism, that the speech is thrown together in a heap 
or lacks a compelling logic of composition, also seems misguided.  Socrates 
himself implicitly acknowledges what is misguided about the criticism, 
when he claims that Lysias seemed to have said “not without some 
nobility, whatever came to his mind as he wrote” (264b).  This appearance 
of spontaneity is surely intentional, and as above, part of the rhetorical 
technique Lysias means to employ in order to effect persuasion.  First, the 
speech is obviously meant as something one says while already in the process 
of seducing a boy.  This speech could not possibly be the ﬁrst thing one said 
to a boy—rather, it would be something that one works into an already 
ongoing conversation after having stated one’s interest, one’s proposal 
and one’s lack of love.  So this beginning at the end is hardly a fault of 
the speech, or is a fault only if one makes an implausible assumption 
about how the speech is to be employed.  Second, the beginning with the 
end of a love affair is hardly accidental—it is certainly not the case that 
Lysias composed the speech willy-nilly, taking whatever came to his mind 
ﬁrst.  Rather, the seemingly illogical structure is an example of feigned 
artlessness.12  By seeming not to have composed the speech artfully, Lysias 
artfully persuades the boy of his case.  By contrast, the order of Socrates’ 
ﬁrst speech is so remarkable—so clear and logical—that Socrates has to 
attribute its composition to divinities (263d-e).13  Plato’s Phaedrus, on the 
other hand, has just such an appearance of spontaneity.
In sum, the ideal of organic unity as stated seems weak as a critical tool, 
or rather, its legitimacy is called into question by the way Socrates uses it 
to critique Lysias’ speech. Socrates’ criticisms seem unfair.  To oversimplify 
somewhat, this is so because Socrates focuses his analysis too narrowly 
on the speech’s formal features and he fails to account for its soul-leading, 
or psychagogic, features.  This latter omission is surprising since, prior to 
the discussion of the organic ideal, Socrates deﬁnes rhetoric as a “certain 
guiding of the soul through words” (261a).  One might be tempted to say, 
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against Socrates, that Lysias’ speech is actually admirable for its formal 
features, when one takes into account his intention to persuade, that is, to 
guide the soul of his audience.  Further, if we take Socrates’ two criticisms 
seriously, then we must conclude that Socrates’ ﬁrst speech is superior to 
the Palinode.  Further, it would follow that written speeches, because they 
are planned and their parts are mapped out ahead of time, are in general 
better than conversations.  These two implications are, in the context of 
the Phaedrus, untenable.
III
When Phaedrus protests that Socrates is “scofﬁng at our speech” (264e), 
Socrates cuts off his analysis of Lysias’ speech and claims that “Lysias’ 
speech does offer abundant examples which could be proﬁtably examined, 
provided no one attempted to imitate them” (264e).  This suggests that 
Socrates has in mind to continue his critique, and, perhaps, to elaborate 
on the ideal of organic unity.  I attempt to reconstruct those criticisms 
from two sources: Plato’s criticisms as they are implied by the parody 
and Socrates’ earlier overt criticisms of the speech (234d-235b, 242d-243d). 
As I will show, these prior criticisms not only anticipate those based on 
the organic ideal as stated but also go much further in indicating what is 
truly wrong with Lysias’ speech.
There can be little doubt that the speech of Lysias is a Platonic parody. 
I claim elsewhere that parody is an imitation that distorts its target text, 
author or genre, and in that distortion, one can often ﬁnd an implicit 
criticism.14  Plato parodies ﬁve aspects of the speech in order to display four 
parodic criticisms.  These four criticisms include, but go much farther than, 
the formal-structural criticisms based on the ideal of organic unity.  
First, the speech consists of a set of unrelated arguments which are 
strung together in a way to give the impression of spontaneity.  The parody 
achieves this effect through the exaggerated use of kai men dê (5 times) 
and eti de (4 times) as connectives at the beginning of sentences.15  These 
phrases function here as weak connectives which merely list a series of 
arguments without making any logical connection amongst them.16    
Second, the rhetorical effect of the speech is accomplished almost 
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entirely by parallelism, through an excessive use of antithetical 
grammatical structures.  The speech is largely structured by men ... de 
parallelism, of which there are sixteen instances.  The use of men ... de is 
mechanical and repetitive, contrasting lovers and non-lovers eight times, 
nine counting the time the speaker contrasts lovers with himself.17  Indeed, 
the speech consists primarily in the repeated assertion of the comparative 
beneﬁts and harms.18  Further, as Dimock has demonstrated, the speech 
also parodies Lysias’ use of alla, in particular his use of eliminative alla, (i.e. 
ou ... alla: ‘not this … but this’).19  The speech contains seventeen instances 
(compared to only 6 in Socrates’ speech), and there are six in succession 
near the end of the speech (233e5-234b1).  
Third, to the extent that there are arguments, the speech uses, indeed 
overuses, arguments from ‘plausibility’—in two Stephanus pages, we 
ﬁnd four uses of eikos and cognates. The parody of eikos arguments here 
is likely directed at sophistic rhetoric in general and not necessarily at 
Lysias in particular.20  Later, Socrates discusses the ‘Plausible Argument’ 
in detail, making it central to the rhetorical art as a whole, and castigating 
it as an enemy of truth and, in the end, “nothing other than the opinion 
of the masses” (273b). 
Fourth, the speech is impersonal in the extreme, which might be ﬁne 
for a piece of political rhetoric, but seems offensive in a speech requesting 
“something so precious” as sexual favors (231d).  Both the speaker and the 
addresses remain totally anonymous.  While the speaker uses the second 
person singular to refer to the boy, he never addresses the beloved in the 
vocative.21  Nor does the non-lover give any special reason why he has 
chosen this boy instead of that.  In fact, since such considerations might 
suggest personal affection, i.e. love, they are ruled out by the premise 
of the speech.  Nor again does he give an adequate reason why the boy 
should choose the speaker over any other non-lover, except paradoxically 
by relying on an argument that makes the non-lover parallel to the lover 
(234b-c).   
Last, the speech subtly calls attention to itself precisely as written.  The 
use of antithetical turns of phrase suggests prior composition.  Most of 
all, the written character of the speech is most clear from the last words 
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of the speech: “just ask” (234c).  The speech requests questions from its 
audience, almost as a kind of challenge.  The speaker does not really think 
it necessary for anyone to take up this challenge, as he believes that his 
words are already “sufﬁcient” (234c).  
To summarize, the parody asserts four general criticisms of Lysias’ 
speech.  First, it is poorly organized.  Second, in its overreliance on stylistic 
phrasing and the ‘Plausible Argument,’ it reveals an indifference to the 
truth, that is, the speaker shows no erôs for truth.  The speech contains 
almost only “stylistic elaboration” and very little—if any—actual analysis 
of the topic.22  Such stylistic elaboration gives the speech impressive-
sounding phrases which may very well impress, and thus, persuade, 
an uncritical audience. Third, the speech reveals an indifference to its 
audience, that is, the speaker shows no erôs for his interlocutor.  In this 
sense, the speech enacts its basic assumption, or put another way, the 
speech’s basic assumption comes in for parodic criticism.  Last, the speech 
cannot, because written, live up to its promise to respond to the boy’s—or 
anybody’s—questions.
IV
Socrates’ prior criticisms of Lysias’ speech can be divided into two 
groups: those which immediately follow the speech (234d-236b) and those 
which immediately follow Socrates’ own non-lover speech (242b-243d). 
Note that Socrates’ ﬁrst speech is immune to, indeed is composed as a 
remedy for, the ﬁrst set of criticisms, but it is targeted, along with Lysias’ 
speech, in the second set of criticisms.  The ﬁrst set is fairly superﬁcial, 
but instructively so, since the criticisms overlap with those based on the 
ideal of organic unity.      
Socrates ﬁrst articulates three overlapping criticisms, which focus 
on the style and organization of the speech.  When Phaedrus raises the 
question of the adequacy of the speech’s treatment of its topic, Socrates 
replies, “I was only thinking of its rhetoric” (235a).  On this score, Socrates 
accuses the speech of being (1) repetitive; (2) lacking depth; and (3) 
showing off.  The entire speech is a series of slight variations on the same 
men ... de claim: Lovers cause harm, while non-lovers only beneﬁt.  The 
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use of eliminative alla is “uneconomical,” a way to say “the same thing 
twice, as it were, once negatively and once positively.”23  Clearly, a speech 
which relies so heavily on these grammatical turns of phrase is going to 
lack depth.   The lack of depth is also shown by the preponderance of 
kai men dê and eti de in introducing new points.  With so many new and 
logically unrelated points, there is no deﬁnition and no real analysis, i.e. 
no organic unity.  Lysias’ “youthful swagger” consists in his showing off 
his facility with rhetorical phrasing, by repackaging the same points in 
different ways.  Socrates ironically praises the speech because “each of its 
phrases was clear, compact and well-turned” (235a); the irony comes not 
from an implied denial that the phrases were in the end well-done but 
rather from an implied denial of the idea that the accumulation of such 
well-turned phrases makes a speech well-done.  Socrates goes on to say 
the main problem with the speech is the “arrangement (tên diathesin)” 
of the arguments (236a4).  In short, Socrates ﬁrst set of criticisms seems 
clearly to be focused on the lack of a deﬁnition and analysis, that is, the 
lack of organic unity.  
After Socrates gives his own speech, with his head covered, he is stopped 
from walking away from Phaedrus by his daimonic sign, and realizing his 
“offense,” he decides to repent his speech and make another one in its 
place (241e-242d).  Here he supplies a new set of criticisms, which ﬁnd 
fault with both Lysias’ speech and Socrates non-lover speech for the same 
reasons.  These reasons reﬂect some of the more serious parodic criticisms 
outlined above.  Both speeches are castigated as terrible (deinon) because 
they were (1) foolish (euêthê) and (2) irreverent (asebê).  While Socrates’ 
non-lover speech exceeds Lysias’ in terms of overall organization, it does 
no better on these more serious grounds.  The speeches are foolish, ﬁrst 
of all, because they falsely characterize love.  Lysias’ speech is a paignia, 
that is, a playful display speech, meant to impress an audience with its 
virtuoso rhetoric.  Its falseness is implicitly acknowledged.24  To put the 
same point differently, the speeches are foolish also because they elevate 
style over truth, being “very reﬁned [and] putting on airs” in an attempt to 
“win [audience] praise” (242e-243a).  The speeches are foolish, second of all, 
because they are intentionally deceptive.  Socrates’ speech makes apparent 
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what Lysias’ speech leaves implicit, that the non-lover is dissembling.  Of 
course, he is, in a vulgar sense, ‘in love’ with the boy; otherwise, there is 
no reason why he would proposition him in the ﬁrst place.  
The speeches are shameful and irreverent in that they offend against the 
god, Erôs, which Socrates claims,  “could not be bad in any way” (242e). 
They were both ﬁt for sailors (243b) in constricting the sense of love to 
base sexual desire and not even considering a nobler kind of love.  Of 
course, the rhetoric of the non-lover speeches would have been entirely 
undermined by acknowledging a noble form of love, since such a love 
would clearly be superior to the crass opportunism advocated by the 
ﬁrst two speeches.  The divine Erôs that Socrates restores, in his Palinode, 
includes both erôs for one’s beloved and erôs for the truth.  The two loves 
are not extrinsic to but rather intertwined with one another, since one 
exhibits one love for the beloved through one’s love for the truth, and one 
exhibits one’s love for the truth in philosophical conversation with one’s 
beloved.  From this perspective, the two non-lover speeches are irreverent 
both for failing to exhibit erôs for the truth and for failing to exhibit erôs for 
the audience.  This connects up with the reasons that the speeches were 
foolish—their implicitly acknowledged falseness shows no love of truth 
and their deceptive intention shows no love of other.25
The criticisms based on the ideal of organic unity as stated only 
manage to reveal the most superﬁcial problems with the speech.  These 
superﬁcial objections are met by Socrates’ non-lover speech, but that 
speech, along with Lysias’, comes in for more serious criticisms.  The 
ideal of organic unity, if it is to be made adequate, has to reﬂect these 
more serious concerns.  In order to do this, we need to jump forward in 
the Phaedrus to the last two sections, on psychagogia (271c-274b) and on 
writing (274b-278b).    
V
I hope to have shown so far that the organic ideal as stated is inadequate 
and intentionally so.  I will now attempt to restate the organic ideal as 
implied by a close reading of the last half of the dialogue.  Three main 
questions drive the second half: How does one write well or poorly?  Is 
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rhetoric a technê? How does one properly organize a speech?  The question 
about organization (which the principle of organic unity answers) must be 
understood in the context of the question of whether rhetoric is a technê, 
and that question must be understood in the context of good writing more 
generally.  Thus, I propose to rewrite the principle of organic unity by 
placing it within the larger context of good writing in general.  To remind, 
the ideal as stated run as follows:
[OU]  A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling 
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds 
to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is written by someone 
with dialectical knowledge of the topic.
In order to make my reasoning in this section maximally clear, I will 
amend the ideal in three stages, each time drawing from an argument in 
the text in order to build up the ideal as implied. Central to this task will 
be the restoration of the soul to the living organism of the written speech, 
and that will force upon it a teleological structure.  The teleological structure 
is twofold: ﬁrst, the telos of the written speech is the effect it has on the 
souls of its human audience; second, the telos of human being either simply 
is, or is best achieved through, the possession of knowledge.26  Success 
for a written speech is thus intimately linked to the facilitation of success 
for a human being.  
After Socrates has established dialectical knowledge as necessary for 
the rhetorician, Phaedrus still insists that “the rhetorical part has escaped” 
(266c).  Phaedrus is right about this: though they had earlier deﬁned 
rhetoric as “a certain guiding of souls (psychagôgia) through words, not 
only in the law courts and other places of public assembly but also in 
private” (261a), this relationship to an audience is left implicit in the 
organic ideal as stated.  In fact, while Socrates insists that anything done 
well requires the dialectical method, he does not deny that some part of 
the rhetorical art has been omitted (266d).  After a digression on technical 
terms from the rhetorical handbooks,27 Socrates explicitly introduces, or 
rather reintroduces, the soul into the discussion as something necessary 
for the art of rhetoric which the rhetorical handbooks leave out (271c). 
Speeches are composed in order to have a certain persuasive effect on 
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the souls of its audience.  This teleological framework is implied but left 
implicit in the organic ideal as stated.  
In order to guide the souls of one’s audience successfully, one needs 
knowledge of the soul and its different types. To achieve this, the speech-
writer will need to “demonstrate the essence of the nature” of the soul 
(270e).  He will have to “describe the soul with full precision (pasêi 
akribeiai)” (271a).  The procedure for this task, as with that for speaking 
about “the nature of anything whatsoever,” involves asking whether 
“a nature is simple or multi-formed … . [I]f simple, we should consider 
its natural capacity … . If it has multiple forms, we must count these 
and examine each of them” (270c-d).  The discussion proceeds, without 
arguing for it, as though the soul were indeed multi-formed.28  This is not 
surprising given the elaborate account of the different kinds of soul in the 
Palinode.  Since different types of souls are affected in different ways by 
different types of speeches, the orator must be able to match the forms of 
soul to the forms of speech.  He does this in order to be able “to explain 
sufﬁciently what type of person is persuaded by what type of speech” and 
“to perceive and to determine for himself in the case of an individual he 
meets that he is this type of person” (271e-272a).29  These considerations 
force both a teleological framework on the principle as a whole and an 
alteration in the description of the speech-writer, since he needs to know 
something beyond his topic:
[OU2]  A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling 
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds 
to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is written by someone 
with dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul in order to 
lead the souls of the readers in the way that the author desires.
This amendment is crucial, since the role of the audience is restored 
to its central place in the goal, or telos, of the composition of speeches.30 
Organic unity is no longer its own end, but rather serves the further 
purpose of persuasive effect on its audience.  The author now stands in 
a relationship to his audience, and this seems to be ‘the rhetorical part’ 
that Phaedrus found lacking.
Some difﬁculties still remain.  When Socrates ﬁrst describes rhetoric as 
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psychagôgia, a ‘leading of the soul,’ he leaves its ambiguous connotations 
intact.  The term carried the implications both of brain-washing through 
propaganda or verbal trickery and of education, properly speaking. 
As I emphasized in discussing the knowledge of the author criterion, 
knowledge is initially understood as an instrumental good.  So too is 
‘leading the soul’ initially understood with its more nefarious implications. 
Even with this new condition explicit, Socrates leaves deception open 
as a possible goal of leading the soul.  Notice that there is no mention of 
truth after the ‘in order to’ clause.  A second problem emerges here with 
more force: the distinction between speaking and writing is several times 
elided.  In fact, when Socrates speaks of identifying the one you meet on 
the street as possessing a certain type of soul, he certainly seems no longer 
to be speaking of written discourse.  
After Socrates sets the knowledge bar extremely high for the 
achievement of the art of rhetoric, Phaedrus, in a severe understatement, 
remarks, “this seems to be no small undertaking” (272b).31   In response, 
Socrates examines “an easier and more concise path,” thereby setting 
truth and plausibility in direct opposition (272c).  Plausibility resembles 
the truth, and draws its power from this resemblance (273d).   The more 
difﬁcult and circuitous path insists on the truth, whereas the pursuit of 
plausibility causes one to “bid the truth a hearty farewell” (272e).  He 
gives the example, supposedly from the rhetorical handbook of Tisias, 
of a small, brave man who assaults a big, cowardly one.  The small man 
should insist that he could not possibly have assaulted such a large man, 
and the large man should insist that the small man had help from others. 
Neither should tell the truth, since no one would believe it.  The argument 
from plausibility, thus, depends on, appeals to and indeed strengthens the 
“opinion of the masses” at the expense of the truth (273b).  
Socrates insists that one should appeal to and gratify the gods, rather 
than one’s “fellow slaves,” since the gods are “masters who are good 
and from good stock” (274a).  One should gratify one’s fellow slaves 
“in a secondary way,” presumably by persuading them of the truth, and 
not merely by leading their souls wherever one wishes.  In other words, 
persuading the audience of the truth must be the genuine goal of a written 
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speech and thus it must be added to the principle of organic unity: 
[OU3]  A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling 
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds 
to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is written by someone 
with dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul in order to lead 
the souls of the readers toward the truth. 
The reference to ‘truth’ in the ‘in order to’ clause closes off the 
possibility of deception being a goal of the organically written speech. 
What is implied by this is a caring, or at minimum beneﬁcent, attitude 
toward one’s audience.  The nature of the relationship between author 
and audience is now clearer: it is that of an educator to a student.  The 
educator, in leading his student toward the truth, displays erôs toward 
him or her. 
From the earliest passages in the second half of the dialogue, Socrates 
conﬂates speaking and writing.  It is only at the end that he ﬁnally and 
wholly answers the question of what makes a written speech well done by 
telling and analyzing a myth about writing “heard from our ancestors” 
(274c).  This confounding of the two is not accidental, as we shall see, since 
writing well—in the most general sense—is intimately related to speaking 
well.  In discussing this last section of the dialogue on writing,32  I hope 
to make the teleological structure of the principle clearer by clarifying 
the intended audience of written texts, the manner in which they affect 
their readers, and their proper style. While initially critical of writing, the 
account does leave writing a positive role.  
The ﬁrst criticisms of writing are those of the divine King Thamus, who 
rebukes the technician god Theuth for “not speak[ing] beautifully” about 
his invention of writing (274eff.).  While Theuth claims to have discovered 
a “drug for memory and wisdom”, Thamus counters that the former has 
described “the opposite of their real effect” (274e-275a).  First, writing 
will “produce a forgetting in the souls of those who learn letters,” rather 
than memory, since those who trust writing will rely on it as a “reminder” 
and deem living memory superﬂuous (275a).  Second, writing offers its 
students “an apparent, not a true wisdom”; students and readers “appear 
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rich in knowledge when for the most part there’s an absence of knowledge, 
and they will appear wise rather than being wise” (275a-b).  To put this 
second point more forcefully, instead of producing wisdom, writing will 
produce the worst kind of ignorance: self-ignorance.33  
When Phaedrus responds to this myth by playfully mocking Socrates 
for his ability to construct fables, Socrates rebukes him for caring about 
the source of claims rather than their truth.  Whereas Phaedrus blithely 
assents to Thamus’ assessment, Socrates proceeds to analyze the criticisms. 
The king’s criticisms do not leave any space for good writing, but Socrates’ 
four-part assessment and critique of the king’s criticisms do. 
First, Socrates explains why writing can engender self-ignorance 
without saying that it necessarily does.  Writings enshrine particular 
formulations which have the appearance of clear knowledge.  Someone 
believing that there will be “something clear and secure in these written 
forms” is “exceedingly simple-minded” (275c); in possession of these, he 
might think himself wise when he is not.34  
Second, Socrates ﬁnds a positive role for reminders.  By saying that 
“written speeches are [nothing] more than reminders for a person already 
in the know” (275d), he departs from Thamus’ assessment, since, for the 
latter, being a reminder was positively detrimental to knowledge and 
memory.  On Socrates’ account, though one cannot acquire new knowledge 
from writings—one cannot learn from them—they can serve as reminders 
for those who already know.  This positive function for reminding echoes 
the Palinode, where Socrates has claimed that the correct use of reminders 
(hupomnasin) allows one to recollect (anamnêsis) what one’s soul once saw 
in the hyperuranium circuit (249c).   
Third, Socrates articulates additional criticisms, ones not mentioned 
by Thamus, based on an analogy with painting.  Writing’s creations, like 
those of a painting, “stand there as if alive, but if you question them, they 
remain in complete and solemn silence” (275d).  Written texts are neither 
responsive nor interactive—one cannot engage them in a dialogue.  On 
the other hand, a written text can be used for any purpose, even by “those 
who have no business reading it,” since a written text cannot discern “to 
whom it should speak and to whom it shouldn’t” (275d-e).  A written 
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speech is “unable by itself to defend or help itself” and thus “always 
needs the help of its father” (275e).  These are serious criticisms, and they 
threaten to close off the space that Socrates made for good writing.  The 
incentive for reader to read and for author to write seems to dissipate 
under the weight of these claims.  If in reading, all one acquires is a bad 
interlocutor, one who speaks but neither listens nor responds, then one 
has little reason to read.  If, in writing, all one achieves is the possibility 
of having one’s claims twisted by uncomprehending readers, then one 
has little incentive to write.   
Fourth, Socrates introduces “a legitimate brother” to written speech and 
places written speech in the context of and in relation to spoken speech. 
This legitimate brother is “by nature better and more capable” in that it can 
“defend itself” and “knows when and to whom it should speak” (276a). 
Socrates identiﬁes this brother as what “is written with knowledge in the 
soul of one who understands,” and Phaedrus clariﬁes that this is “the 
speech of a person who knows, a speech living and ensouled, the written 
version of which would justly be called an image” (276a).35  The model, 
or ideal, seems to be the speech of the knowledgeable dialectician, the 
only one qualiﬁed to write in the ﬁrst place (see above), and his writings 
are an image of his own dialectical conversations.  Clearly, part of the 
point here is that living dialectic is superior to writing.  But it is equally 
clear that Socrates overtly recognizes a legitimate use for writing.  If the 
knowledgeable dialectician writes, he will do so “in the joy of play,” 
building up a “treasure trove of reminders both for himself … and for all 
those who walk down the same path and he’ll take pleasure watching the 
tender shoots in the garden grow” (276d).  He repeats this criterion a bit 
later, restricting an author’s readers to “men who know” (278a).  Thus, to 
remedy the difﬁculty posed by an uncomprehending general readership, 
Socrates restricts the scope of the legitimate audience to knowers including 
but not limited to the author himself.   
Given these considerations, we might reformulate the principle of 
organic unity as follows: 
[OU4] A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a compelling 
logic of composition which begins with an accurate deﬁnition and proceeds 
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to analyze the topic according to its nature and it is playfully written by 
someone with dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul and 
it is an image of his own living, ensouled discourse, i.e. dialectic, in 
order to lead the souls of knowers back toward the truth. It achieves this 
by functioning as a reminder of one’s already obtained dialectical 
knowledge (i.e., what is ‘written in the soul’).36
This is an advance on the earlier deﬁnition in several important ways. 
First and foremost, it recognizes the priority relationship between living 
dialectic and writing.  Second, knowledge is recognized as the proper 
goal of man, and thus the proper goal of writing.  Third, it elaborates on 
the function of writing by specifying a more particular audience, that of 
knowers, and by articulating the manner of its soul-leading, i.e. reminding. 
Fourth, it implies the playful intention of the author since he will not take 
his own writings very seriously in the ﬁrst place.  Fourth, it implies a 
criterion of style: since writing is properly an image of living dialectic, it 
can best achieve its task through the portrayal of living dialectic.  Since the 
knowers presumably arrived at the same knowledge through dialectical 
inquiry, presumably they can be best reminded of it through an image of 
dialectical inquiry.  A long speech, though not ruled out, would be less 
ideal. 
There are also several problems with this reformulation of the principle. 
First, we are left with a picture of writing, in which it properly operates 
only within an elitist, closed system.  Writing is either inherently private, 
only functioning as a reminder for the author himself, or inherently 
uninformative, only functioning for the elite group of knowers already 
possessing the dialectical knowledge.  In either case, no souls are led 
anywhere they haven’t already been and the educative function of writing 
seems entirely undermined.  The dialogue seemingly established between 
author and reader is lost.  Second, and related, the discussion of the 
artfulness of rhetoric seems now to have been irrelevant to the goodness 
of writing.  Socrates reiterates the conclusions of that discussion (277b-c), 
emphasizing once again the necessity of dialectical knowledge of both the 
topic and the soul, if speeches, both spoken and written, are to teach or 
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persuade.  But, on this view, writing is not able to teach or persuade at all. 
Therefore, it cannot be done artfully.  Third, Socrates has all along been 
attempting to generate in Phaedrus a critical attitude toward writing, that 
is, an attitude which entails that one critically examines a text.  However, 
if one sees written texts as reminders for those who know, one might be 
tempted to think oneself wise, and either see in a piece of writing what 
one already thinks one knows, or dismiss it as false.  Finally, this model 
conceives of knowledge as straightforwardly attainable and transmittable 
through oral dialectic, though this seems in contradiction with the account 
of human nature as erotic in the Palinode. 37  The required knowledge of 
the soul, for example, is there restricted to the gods, while humans can 
only describes what the soul is like (246a).  To this issue, I now turn. 
VI
At one point, Socrates explicitly acknowledges that the bar for good 
writing is set extremely high.  When Phaedrus sums up his impression of 
Socrates’ account, he says, “That’s said very beautifully, it seems to me, 
Socrates, if only anyone could do it”; in reply, Socrates claims, “And yet 
even in reaching for the beautiful there is beauty, and also in suffering what 
one suffers en route” (274a-b). To reﬂect this striving for the beautiful in 
the principle of organic unity requires acknowledging the erotic nature of 
man’s relationship to knowledge as articulated in the Palinode.  There are 
clear parallels here to the Palinode itself.  Recall that beauty is precisely 
the element in which the philosopher most clearly has his vision of the 
form.  So too does the talk of gratifying the gods (274b) reintroduce the 
divine—so prominent in the Palinode—into the discussion.  The mention 
of the gods’ “good stock” hearkens back to the description of the soul’s 
good horse (246a8).38  In addition, the description of philosophical 
education in terms of nourishment and procreation has “erotic overtones” 
and is reminiscent of the Palinode.39  We must, of course, tread carefully 
here: what is ‘true’ and what ‘false’ in the Palinode is not obvious, though 
Socrates is convinced that some parts of it are in fact true (265b-c).  Even 
on the most austere, minimalist reading of the Palinode, human nature 
strives for, but does not achieve, divine wisdom—not even when the soul 
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is detached from the body does it attain a full view of the beings in the 
hyperuranian realm (248a-e).  In the myth, certain souls do attain a partial 
view of the forms, but what they see and for how long depends on whose 
train they are in and how they lived their previous lives. 
I propose to reformulate the principle of organic unity in order to 
acknowledge the erotic nature of man.  I will do so in two stages, for 
clarity’s sake, by inserting uncertainty into the deﬁnition in the places 
where full and complete knowledge are assumed.  First, I will formulate an 
alternative to [OU3] above, by acknowledging uncertainty in four places: 
ﬁrst, the possessor of dialectical knowledge becomes a seeker of dialectical 
knowledge, i.e. a philosopher; second, the accurate deﬁnition and analysis 
becomes desired rather than completed, third, the teleological function 
of a written text cannot be guaranteed to succeed since the knowledge of 
soul will not be complete; ﬁnally, what the reader will be turned toward 
is not the truth but the pursuit of truth, partly alleviating the implication 
of success.  The resulting redeﬁnition runs thus: 
[OU3*]  A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a 
compelling logic of composition which seeks an accurate deﬁnition and 
analysis of its topic and it is written by someone who seeks dialectical 
knowledge both of the topic and of the soul, i.e. a philosopher, in order to 
attempt to lead the souls of the readers toward the pursuit of truth.
As partial confirmation of this move, we might note that when 
Phaedrus asks what name to assign to the author of written speeches that 
live up to the ideal, he forgoes “wise person” and instead labels him a 
“lover of wisdom,” i.e. a “philosopher” (278d).40
Now I will attempt to rewrite [OU4] in such a way that acknowledges 
man’s erotic nature.  In addition to the above changes, I make substitutions 
in three places: ﬁrst, I substitute ‘philosophers’ for ‘knowers’ as the 
intended audience; second, the reminding is attempted rather than 
achieved; third, what one is reminded of is not fully achieved dialectical 
knowledge, but the partial vision of the disembodied soul.  The resulting 
redeﬁnition runs thus:
[OU4*] A written speech is organically uniﬁed iff it follows a 
compelling logic of composition which seeks an accurate deﬁnition and 
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analysis of its topic and it is playfully written by someone who seeks 
dialectical knowledge both of the topic and of the soul, i.e. a philosopher, 
and it is a image of his own living, ensouled discourse, i.e. dialectic, in order 
to attempt to lead the souls of philosophers toward the pursuit of truth.  
It attempts this by functioning as a reminder of the soul’s previously 
attained knowledge (i.e., what is written in the soul).
It will be useful to see how this reformulation deals with the objections 
leveled above against [OU4].  First, this principle seems no longer as 
open to the charge that writing belongs only to a closed elitist system.  In 
one sense, it is still elitist—the intended audience now is philosophers 
instead of knowers.  However, the system is more open in the sense that 
being a philosopher is not, like being a knower, a settled matter. If one 
responds to a writing in a philosophical way, then one is in fact one of 
those to whom the writing is addressed; if not, not.  In other words, the 
‘discrimination’ is self-selecting and if one is persuaded by a text that one 
would like to be a philosopher, then, in some sense, one in fact already is. 
On this account, dialectic is not a completed achievement, but a process 
of investigation.  The conception of writing is also still in part elitist, as it 
does claim that good writing will be able to provoke a true insight.  These 
true insights are arguably open only to those whose souls were relatively 
unencumbered in their circuit around the heavens.  But again the matter is 
not settled ahead of time—by gaining an insight into the matter at hand, 
you thereby show yourself to have been, in the Palinode’s terms, in the 
train of Zeus in the ﬁrst place.41  This account shows good writing to be 
provocative of philosophical inquiry in its readers, turning their souls 
toward the pursuit of truth.  
Second, on this account, writing can function as a tool for teaching 
and persuading, and thus can be done artfully.  What a text can persuade 
of, ﬁrst of all, is the need to engage in philosophical inquiry.  It can do 
this both by provoking an insight into a given topic and by providing a 
model of critical inquiry—of dialectic—for emulation.  What we can learn 
through the written text will not be a set of doctrines or claims.  Rather, 
we can learn through our own philosophical engagement with the text. 
In this sense, what we learn will be both taught and self-taught.  The 
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dialogue between author and reader, lost in the formulation of [OU4], 
remains here.  In addition, the model of oral dialectic, which consisted in 
the more or less straightforward transmission of knowledge from knower 
to learner, is more questioning and unﬁnished, and knowledge remains 
as its extremely difﬁcult ideal goal.  A written speech becomes more like 
a human being than a tree, which Socrates claims has nothing to teach 
him (230d).  Third, and related, the critical attitude that Socrates takes 
toward the written speeches within the dialogue and that attitude which 
he attempts to instill in Phaedrus is clearly the kind of attitude that this 
model encourages for someone approaching a written text.  One cannot 
be certain enough of the author’s knowledge or of one’s own to accept 
or reject a text out of hand for failing or succeeding to remind one of 
one’s already obtained knowledge.  One must put questions to the text 
to ﬁnd out whether it leads somewhere philosophically fruitful.  To put 
the point differently, the success of a written speech is, in the end, up to 
us, its readers.  
VII
As a ﬁnal test of the preferability of [OU4*] to [OU4], I want to turn 
to the Phaedrus itself to see how these principles fare in assessing both 
the possible purpose of the Phaedrus—its telos—as a written work and its 
much-debated unity.  The former is a more important test, in my view, 
since the reconstruction of the principle of organic unity has shown, if 
anything, that the arrangement of parts, though not inconsequential, is 
not the best standard by which to assess a written work.  
If Plato were committed to [OU4], then his writing and publishing of 
the Phaedrus is somewhat puzzling.  We might express this as a dilemma: 
either Plato thought he possessed dialectical knowledge of the dialogue’s 
topic (intentionally left indeterminate here) and the soul, and he wrote 
the Phaedrus only for himself and his students in the Academy (i.e. those 
who have walked along the same dialectical path), in which case the 
rest of us probably have no business reading it; or Plato did not think he 
possessed the relevant dialectical knowledge, in which case his writing 
the Phaedrus is a performative contradiction.  Against the second horn, 
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it seems clear that Plato could hardly have been unaware of the high 
standard he was setting for a written text since he calls attention to it in 
the dialogue (discussed above).  Against the ﬁrst horn, the Phaedrus clearly 
fails to represent a successful dialectical conversation—it does not depict 
a dialogue that begins with a deﬁnition and proceeds to analyze the topic. 
Nor does it seem to have a uniﬁed topic in the requisite sense.  So Plato 
either misunderstood or misapplied his own criteria; both are, of course, 
possible, but both also seem to make the dialogue, in an important sense, 
incoherent or self-undermining.42
If Plato were committed to [OU4*], however, his writing and publishing 
of the Phaedrus does make sense.  On this view, Plato writes the Phaedrus 
as a reminder for its readers to engage in philosophical inquiry.43  This 
makes Plato’s intention with respect to his readership parallel to that of 
Socrates with respect to his interlocutors.  Both intend to turn the souls 
of their audiences toward philosophy, to generate in them a true insight 
into the nature of the topic at hand and, thus, to make them active in the 
pursuit of wisdom through dialectical conversation.  It is the establishment 
of a kind of dialogue between author and reader.  This modest goal seems 
not to require going beyond the limitations of writing.  This dialogue may 
begin the kind of cycle of oral dialectic that Socrates describes as continuing 
to “pass this seed on, forever immortal” (277a).  If the author of these 
speeches is properly a philosopher, as Socrates insists he should be called 
(278d), then success is measured by the number of critical responses and 
discussions that is has provoked in other philosophers.  By this measure, 
the Phaedrus is an exceedingly successful written work.   
I think I have shown that organic unity is not an end in itself, since 
the true measure of a written work lies not in the organization of its parts 
but in the souls of its audience.  In one sense, this paper is an attempt 
at making organic unity a central concern of the Phaedrus, and this is 
shown to be an impossible task.  So, an excessive focus on the unity (or 
not) of the Phaedrus is misguided.44  On the other hand, the principle 
of organic unity (on either the [OU4] or [OU4*] formulation) shows that 
Plato considered organic unity a desideratum, and that he likely thought 
the Phaedrus uniﬁed.  The question is, does [OU4] or [OU4*] better reﬂect 
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the kind of unity the dialogue has?  I will approach this question through 
two puzzles: What exactly is main topic of the Phaedrus? How could the 
Phaedrus be an instance of an organically uniﬁed work if it contains the 
parody of Lysias, an example of a poorly uniﬁed work?  [OU4*] gives more 
adequate answers than [OU4] with respect to both puzzles.
The kind of unity demanded by [OU4] is more rigid than that of [OU4*], 
in part because the model of oral dialectic associated with [OU4*] is more 
ﬂuid that associated with [OU4].  [OU4] assumes that a written work both 
represents and reminds its audience of the successful dialectical analysis 
of a single topic.45  Though dialectical analyses are certainly present, 
the Phaedrus is clearly not organized around a single topic or theme.46 
There are, as many have point out, several topics or themes that hold the 
dialogue together: erôs, rhetoric, the soul, self-knowledge, philosophy, etc. 
On [OU4], we seem to need to make a choice, but each choice must ignore 
evidence for the other possibilities.  By contrast, [OU4*] is more ﬂexible, 
since it makes a written work representative of a dialectical analysis 
that was not necessarily successful.  If one seeks rather than achieves 
a dialectical analysis of one’s intended topic, then, like in an ordinary 
conversation, one will perhaps move from the initial topic to a related one. 
This is to deny that organic unity entails unity of theme or topic.  These 
reﬂections perhaps even warrant a small amendment to [OU4*], changing 
“the topic” to “the topic(s)”. 
The speech of Lysias, which not only lacks organic unity but is foolish 
and irreverent as well, also seems out of place given [OU4]’s more rigid 
conception of unity.  It is strange that Plato would include it in an avowedly 
organically uniﬁed work, since it seems to undermine any claim the 
dialogue has to organic unity: it is not a dialectical analysis, it purports 
to be written by someone without knowledge, and it is intentionally 
deceptive.  In addition, though Socrates admits that the speech is not 
entirely false, it’s hard to see how successful oral dialectic requires the 
inclusion of false or misleading claims about erôs, or how exposure to 
such claims will remind one of the truth.  On [OU4*], however, Plato’s goal 
is the generation of true insight(s) and the provocation of philosophical 
inquiry.  A false and poorly uniﬁed speech might, to someone already 
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interested in speeches, be used to provoke a philosophical response, as 
Socrates does with Phaedrus.47  For one who already knows, by contrast, 
this seems a perverse strategy.  Plato’s fourth century readers were more 
likely to be interested in rhetorical speeches than, for example, his students 
in the Academy.  To be successful in rhetoric, both the principle of organic 
unity and the dialogue as a whole show, requires knowledge.  To acquire 
knowledge requires endeavoring to pursuit it, i.e. doing philosophy.48  
The conclusion that one should pursue knowledge is not only 
repeatedly argued for, but the structure of the dialogue leads one, step 
by step through its seemingly disparate parts, to this conclusion.  I can 
only brieﬂy sketch the dialectical or palinodic progression I have in mind 
here.49  As we saw, Socrates’ non-lover speech, while surpassing Lysias’ in 
unity and organization, was still committed to a one-sided account of erôs 
and thus did not exceed it in truth.  So Socrates literally takes that speech 
back and offers the Palinode in its place, with its grand vision of a noble 
form of erôs.  While the Palinode was clearly more adequate with respect 
to erôs, it does not enact one of the core teachings of that speech. Socrates 
is giving a long speech to Phaedrus and not investigating along with him, 
as the Palinode recommends.  After the Palinode, Socrates does engage in 
a dialectical inquiry with Phaedrus into the nature of rhetorical speeches, 
thus enacting the model of education articulated in the Palinode.  But that 
dialectic calls attention to itself as written by highlighting the distinction 
between writing and speaking, thereby revealing the limitations of the 
written work of the Phaedrus.  We are thus encouraged to respond to the 
written Phaedrus in the way that Socrates responds to the myth of Theuth 
and Thamus, that is, by analyzing, assessing, and criticizing it to see where 
its truth lies.  To do this is already to begin to do philosophy.
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